Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. This paper describes past and current situations in the Navy Reserve, reviews some fundamentals, and then assesses the current strategy by applying a Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability (FAS) test. It concludes with recommendations for changes or a redirection of future transformation efforts.
STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL: A STEP TOO FAR FOR THE NAVY RESERVE
How we manage our Reserve Components will determine how well we as a nation are prepared to fight, today and tomorrow.
-Paul Wolfowitz
For 91 years (some may claim for 231 years) the citizen-sailors of the Naval Reserve have proudly and successfully answered the call to duty whenever it was sounded. They have provided a strategic reserve, like a grand insurance policy that pays out operational dividends in times of emergency, crisis, or war. However, since the 1990s this strategy has undergone some evolutionary changes in an attempt to transform the Navy Reserve (renamed as of 29 April 2005) so it will pay out operational dividends-all the time. Many are now referring to this as an "operational Reserve." That term-for the Navy-describes the gradual move toward the necessity for the Reserve force to play an increasingly active role in the day-to-day planning and operational requirements of the active Navy. Some claim this transformation is inevitable, given the security environment. Admiral Mullen aptly describes this environment:
Perhaps no other challenge is as daunting right now for the Navy as that of defining future force structure, and then building to it. The calculus of force sizing includes the varied and sometimes competing requirements of homeland defense; the Global War on Terror; major combat operations; theater security cooperation; humanitarian assistance; peacekeeping operations and showing the flag --all within the constraints of fiscal responsibility, industrial capacity, and national infrastructure. 1 Unfortunately, for this strategy to succeed, our citizen-sailors must become adept contortionists-just to fulfill their new Reservists role under these circumstances. Indeed, the first-order effects of transforming to an operational reserve are daunting. But, second-and third-order effects should be taken into account for any course of action to determine the implications for the overall success of the mission. So too should a strategy be analyzed for its overall soundness, practicality, and long-term viability. A standard practical assessment that can be applied to analyze strategies is known as a "FAS" assessment, which considers the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the strategy. This assessment enables strategists to holistically evaluate the plan and ensure that it comprehensively attains the desired ends with available means in an acceptable way. The following analysis concludes that an "operational Reserve" for the Navy fails the FAS test. Indeed other services may begin jumping board this transformational ship when the imperative communiqué should be clear: "Abandon ship!" We must avoid embracing a solution that seemingly satisfies the conditions and requirements temporarily. We must find one that assures a proper balance between the active and reserve components, one that will stand the test of time. To do that, a strategy must be demonstrably feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Then it should be properly structured and resourced.
Background-a Historical Overview of the Navy Reserve
As with all U.S. National Guard soldiers and reservists, the Navy Reserve lineage can be traced back to a militia. Navy Reservists began serving in the late 17th century: On 12 June 1775, the first citizen-sailors of Machias, Maine, commandeered the schooner Unity, set sail, and soundly defeated the British warship HMS Margaretta in a heroic battle. 2 On 13 October of that same year, the Continental Congress established a small naval force. But a majority of the citizen-sailors continued serving under the flag of privateers with a "Letter of Marque" in hand.
They formed a lethal flotilla and wreaked further havoc on the British merchant fleet until the end of the Revolutionary War. As it seems with the conclusion of any war-then came a drawdown.
The citizen-sailors returned to their homeports and rejoined their own states' Militia or established their own organizations. The Navy, however, underwent a complete stand-down as of July 1785, when their last naval ship was sold. The newly formed United States would not resurrect a Navy for another nine years. Throughout the 1800s, the citizen-sailors of the country, time and time again, would return to the seas and Great Lakes to augment the regular Navy: They bore arms and supported the force during times of emergency, crisis, or war.
However, it was not until 17 May 1888 that the citizen-sailors were able to "man the rails"
under an officially recognized state naval militia. The success of states naval militias, along with their interoperability with the Navy over the next 12 years, led to the establishment of the "Office of Naval Militia" within the Department of the Navy. The Congress took one further action to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the states' naval militias by passing of the "Naval Militia Act" of 1914, which also created the "Division of Naval Militia Affairs" that same year. The Congress took one final action for the states' naval militias as the war was coming to an end, but this Congressional action was not constructive. Congress repealed all federal laws pertaining to both the states' naval militias and the National Naval Volunteers organization. 7 With no crisis, war, or federal funding, the states then began deactivating their naval militias.
Many governors were quick to mention that the state naval militias had a very short life span of only 30 years, but they were wrong. In New York: "The New York Naval Militia is the only active, federally-recognized Naval Militia with continuous, unbroken service to the country and state for more than a century and a history stretching back to the Revolution." 8 Additionally, some states reactivated their naval militias once again during WW II and utilized them as armory administrators, instructors, and auxiliary coastal troops. 9 Currently, four states have naval militias.
Over the course of the three decades following WW I, the U.S. Navy would take part in three actions-one of them would be another World War. The U.S. Naval Reserve participated in the war, and all of its members not in a deferred status reported to active duty by July 1941.
Within the next four years, the Navy would grow from a force of around 161 thousand to just under 3.4 million members. The vast majority of these wartime recruits were labeled as reservists. 10 At the end of the war, the Navy would draw down to some 385,000 personnel and retain a Reserve force of around 100,000 personnel.
After WW II, the Department of Defense (DoD) was created and the Navy saw twelve different major employments over the next three decades, but only two of them would include Review was intended to be a "comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations. 12 What the Bottom-Up Review did was establish that use of the "Total Force" was no longer just for times of emergency, crisis, or war. For the reserves, this meant a requirement for an operational role in times of peace. All of this set the conditions for an evolution of the old strategy: Mission areas would be shifted; the entire force would be downsized; the cost of national security would be reduced and peace dividends would be realized.
This newly evolved "Total Force" strategy by the DoD was dubbed "compensating leverage; that is, our military leaders are looking for smart, mission-effective ways to leverage the Guard and reserves to help compensate for a smaller active force while maintaining a robust defense capability and controlling peacetime costs." 13 Once again, the nation's security would depend considerably on its military reserve force:
In the political environment existing today, budgets are austere, the structure of all services has been reduced, programs are being cut, and further changes for the military are in progress. The shrinking defense budget has been a powerful catalyst for Congress and the military to take a close look at the possible savings that may be achieved through increased use of the Reserve Component. The possibility of increased reliance on the Reserve may be unpopular with some in the Active duty military. 14 The Navy was able to drift ahead of the other services with this DoD transformation, primarily because "peacetime operations of flying, steaming, and operating take much the same actions, manpower, and effort as wartime operations. This is just the reality of seagoing service." 15 This gave rise in the 1990s to such buzzwords as: "fleet support," "contributory man-days," "contributory support," and "seamless integration." Seamless integration signifies that the transition of a Reservist or reserve unit into an active component takes place with no discernable difference in capability or performance. And "fleet support," "contributory support,"
together with "contributory man-days," were just by-products that attempted to capture and quantify how much the Navy Reserve was operationally leaning towards the Navy. Simply put, this set the course for the reserves to become the active component's partial solution to the mandate of "doing more, with less."
As the 21 st century and aftermath of 9/11 began to unfold, the DoD transformation towards this new "Total Force" gained momentum. "Fully" replaced "seamless" as modifiers for activereserve integration. To fully comprehend this transformation and fully integrate, the Navy initiated the second bottom-up review within a decade, except this time it would be called a
Reserve Zero-Based Review. The Navy's stated rationale for the Zero-Based Review: "It became imperative to restructure and reintegrate the Navy's Reserve into the Navy-to create a properly aligned and integrated total force designed to provide the capabilities outlined in 'Sea
Power 21' and to support the Fleet Response Plan." 16 The Reserve Zero-Based Review not only reaffirmed the "Total Force" strategy from the Bottom-Up Review, it exploited the underlying premise and restructured the foundation of the Navy Reserve to facilitate leaning further towards a more operational role. Although, as the following Congressional testimony indicates, the Navy may have been more focused on using its reservists to take care of business rather then to devise a new strategy:
Since 1990, the Active Duty services have grown languorous from a diet of contributory assistance, recall, and mobilization support. The number of contributory man-days has risen from 1 million in the late 1980's to nearly 13 million a year over the past few years. Rather then confront budget appropriators; the Active Components have been content to fill their force shortfalls with Reserve manpower:
On the surface, it seems that the Navy is beginning to gain long awaited efficiencies from the reserves. The current Commander of the Navy Reserve not only ostensibly agrees but also offers his expectations for the future role of a Navy's Reservist in stating that, "as a nation we can no longer afford to have separate and unequal forces. We can't have what we used to call 'weekend warriors. ' The average reservist now doesn't do weekends. The average reservist now supports what I call supportive commands whenever they can." 18 Herein lies what I believe to be the elemental strategic flaw-this strategy obscures the difference between a "traditional Reserves" and this newly defined "average Reservists." Before elaborating on this, it may be useful to cover some basic fundamentals and nuances regarding the reserve forces.
Some Navy Reserve Fundamentals
The Fundamental Role-Understanding the Mission
As required by Title 10, the Navy Reserve's mission is to provide mission-capable units and qualified individuals to the Navy to support the full range of operations from peace to war. Two lesser statues can be utilized to call up small numbers of reservists to active duty.
The first allows the Service Secretaries to exercise a 15-day call-up, which basically amounts to directing when and/or where their SELRES will perform their annual training. There are current attempts to increase this up to 29 days. The last and least complicated is strictly volunteerism.
All this takes is a willing reservist, a job (validated billet), and enough funding. Formerly, when a volunteer served more then 179 consecutive days, they were included in the active duty end strength, but the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act repealed this requirement.
The Fundamental Principle-Understanding the Nature of the Reservist "There are lots of culture problems in the Navy, about attitudes toward reservists." 24 To many they are seen as whimsically enjoying the best of all possible worlds outside the structure of active duty. But that is far from true and a patently unfair characterization. Drilling
Reservists-"traditional Reservists"-are the nation's time-honored "weekend warrior." They not only already "know the ropes" but also bring with them a wide-ranging variety of additional experience: working as airline pilot, teacher, carpenter, computer systems operator, law enforcement officer, firefighter, doctor, and businessman, just to name a few. The "traditional
Reservist" serves within a very demanding framework of a rotational triad-family, civilian career, and military career. Justifiably so, their primary career and family remains at the top, with the highest priorities two-thirds of the time. It is both elementary and intuitive-in order to
properly balance this triad-that a node of the lowest priority moves upward only when and if it is convenient for the individual.
Mobilization may seem to satisfy the convenience factor, but in reality it only compounds it. Most would argue, rightfully so, that there is no convenient time to compel a person to take a leave of absence from their primary career and family. Nevertheless, the Navy has promulgated a new and clear "message for the reservists is that they need to be prepared to mobilize one or more times during a career-or consider finding a different part-time job." In fact, the current proposed baseline calls for one mobilization-up to 12 months for every five years of service.
Paradoxically, this same second career and "part-time job" in the Army Reserve with an equivalent "5-year training cycle increases unit annual training requirements from 14 days in the first and second years to 21 days in year three and 29 days in year four." 25 To meet these new operational commitments, plus all the other training, readiness, and any emergent requirements, doesn't quite seem to market itself as being either a part-time job or as being too convenient.
Especially, when taking into account additional strategic commitments such as emergencies, crises, and protracted wars. The "traditional Reservist" is silently being squeezed out, forced to evolve into an "average Reservist" due in part, as Lt Gen Hemly puts it, "faced with this, the most likely 'volunteers' are those who often enjoy less responsible positions in civilian life." 26 Perhaps, the term "career Reservist" best describes this next generation of Reservists.
Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability (FAS) Analysis of Current Strategy
Ends, Ways, and Means
The end to this strategy clearly equates to one Navy, in which an "operational Navy
Reserve" is a permanent essential component. So reserve-component units are considered part of the pool of forces that the military expects to use for the foreseeable future. 27 The In reality, the Navy has been gradually condensing their reserve force down into an individual augmentation pool while touting aspirations that the end state be neither Active nor
Reserve-but one Navy. This is readily apparent in the statistics and observations cited above.
Consider also the Navy Reserve Force Commander's recent explanation of the impetus behind this shift towards an augmentation structured force: "Commanders are more likely to ask for smaller numbers of sailors…meaning the reserve center's primary purpose is to provide administrative and logistical support, not to prepare a unit to deploy as a group." 29 The Navy has been there before now, "an augmentee structure within the Naval Reserve was attempted in Additionally, the Navy Reserve's attrition rates are some of the highest, steadily on the rise since 2004, and of great concern. To make matters worse, force structure reductions each year are dramatically skewing these numbers through lessening recruitment goals and concealing actual attritions rates. 34 The third-order effects are yet more astounding. To offset the above, much funding will be expended in providing recruitment and retention incentives. For all Guard and Reservists, the absolute worse possible effect is beginning to surface. Some civilian employers are no longer looking to hire reservists. It seems they too have priorities to balance and fiduciary responsibility to their company and stockholders comes first. 35 Acceptability (Are the Ways Supportable, Worth the Cost, and Ethical?)
Sustainability is the key element in an acceptable strategy. Very basically, "You have to remember that if you call up a reserve unit, it costs just as much as an active unit. The difference is you haven't budgeted for it." 36 Any activity or item that isn't budgeted for within DoD is usually not very sustainable. That reality will not change in the very near future.
Additionally, an "operational Reserve" is not cost effective. Supporters of the reserves have always claimed that the Navy Reserve consumes only three percent of the Navy's budget, yet comprises nearly 20 percent of the force structure. After examining the 2007 personnel budget estimates-the statistical reality is that the Ready Reserves occupy about 17.3 percent of the Total force structure and consume about 7.4 percent of the personnel budget. 37 This still sounds impressive, but they neglect to caveat that the 17.3 percent consists of ready-reserves, 50 percent of whom are IRR members that cost nothing. Plus, the remaining half consists of 80 percent SELRES that serve 39 days. When comparing actual reserve bodies to active duty bodies-nine SELRES (actually 9.35) at 39 days to one active duty person at 365 days-it works out that the reserve's occupy only about 3.9 percent of the day-to-day force but cost 7.4 percent of the budget to maintain. This makes more sense, given SELRES on average-being more senior-cost more per year then their active duty counterpart.
Worse yet, the direct cost of maintaining an operational reserve would not merely equate one reservist with an active sailor. Given the limitations, drilling structures, and being very lenient on productivity, the absolute minimum would be a ratio of five SELRES to every one active sailor. This is based on one active duty sailor averaging roughly 180 productive days annually, taking into account annual leave, weekends, and holidays. Therefore, to get the same production period in an operational Reserve environment would take five SELRES at 36 days to achieve 180 days. However, to get the equal amount of productive days, the Navy would have Reserve, the Navy is paying more per operational day and also incurring more in the future through retirement pay because every drill worked today by a reservist accumulates more retirement points for the reservist down the road. In the end, an argument can be made that a strategic Reserve is cost effective, but the cost for an operational Reserve is virtually cost prohibitive.
Another issue that deals somewhat with costs pertains to mobilizations, which have proven to be costly for Presidents, both monetarily and politically. Mobilizations provide the second reason that an operational Reserve will fail this portion of the FAS assessment. There is an intrinsic tendency to misuse SELRES through a phenomenon known as "volunteer extortion," especially for contingencies that are either small or anticipated to last for only short periods. And this phenomenon will only intensify as the political costs of mobilizations skyrocket in the future. The hardest part about recognizing volunteer extortion is the distinction; it can be as minuscule as a minute or as absurd as up to a year. The later of which, I was privy too first hand, ran rapid through the entire mobilization processes, and was well documented towards the end of the first year of mobilizations. As Paul Connors points out below from his recent article, different extortion methods were and are occurring DoD wide:
Meanwhile the threatening comments-"If you don't volunteer for at least 45 days, that means that you'll be mobilized for a year if you wait for call-up"-need to stop. Threatening individual Guardsmen and reservists is a shoddy way to provide manpower to accomplish a mission away from home, loved ones and civilian careers. 38 Volunteer extortion is not just a crime against the reservists. It extends over onto the other two elements of a reservist's triad because the family and employer do not understand the term "volunteering" when it isn't applied to them but directly impacts them. Or, as Lt Gen Hemly phases it, "requirements to use other than involuntary mobilization authorities places the burden of responsibility for service on the Soldiers' back…, the Soldier is seen as having a clear choice by his family and employer." Affairs is also worried. He clearly states that "the purpose of the reserve components has changed….They are an operational reserve that supports day to day defense requirements." 40 Yet, none of their solutions are going to solve the problem; they merely attempt to provide better incentives to mask the underlying problems and attempt to overcome the second-and thirdorder effects, as shown here:
The debate is about whether the Reserve Components are becoming too expensive and pricing themselves "out-of-the-market." Maintaining medical readiness, family medical considerations, and updating retired pay eligibility criteria are now important to our citizen warriors. Reservists fully understand their duty and are proud to be serving. However, many in the National Guard and Reserve are weighing the factors that affect remaining in the military. They want change and they deserve change. And, yes, some of these needed changes do cost money. 41 Increasing costs associated with utilizing reservists just makes them less and less suitable in an operational world. In an executive summary for the President, the National Security Advisory Group also looked into the overall strategy. They too provided no other insight then to timidly suggest that the train has already left the station. They do offer a warning of the impending train wreck:
The reality is that the operational reserve model is here to stay. However, there is one thing that has to be overhauled: the mobilization process. One of the key differences between operational and strategic RC is the ordering of the three elements:
train, mobilize, and fight. It is paramount for both strategies to have a streamlined and efficient mobilization process, but more so for a strategic reserve-given mobilization comes first. This should never happen:
The mobilization of the Naval Reserve for the ongoing war against terrorism continues a very old story of bureaucratic bungling and mismanagement. Although naval mobilization was thoroughly disastrous in Operation Desert Storm, and many studies, revisions and plans were generated after the 1991 war to ensure future success, so far it has been the same incompetence as usual." The emerging potential for maritime threats and low-altitude attacks, as well as the utility of maritime forces in responding to many catastrophic disasters also augurs the need for an organizational structure that better utilizes the Navy's capacity to support homeland security. Several states with maritime interests already have state naval militias. In fact, the New York Naval Militia assisted in the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . Creating a Navy Guard to include all coastal states would offer several advantages. A Navy Guard would provide coastal states with more resources to address their state maritime security and public safety requirements. Unlike the Coast Guard, the Navy Guard would focus on state needs when not on active federal service. It would also provide an organization within the National Guard and the Navy that treats homeland security missions as an inherent responsibility and would work to develop the requisite competencies and capabilities to fully support these tasks. Finally, a Navy Guard would provide a suitable partner for the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure seamless integration of daily the Defense and Homeland Security departments' maritime operations. 47 There is no a better way to capture the "traditional" Reservists' and provide them with the capabilities to rebalance their triad then by increasing their convenience, accessibility, and above all else, their reach ability for their part-time job. There is no a better way to add to the Navy reserve end-strength, since Guard and Militia members would create another residual pool for the Navy to draw from, as clearly stated in the memorandum from the New Your State Naval
Militia to Navy Reserve noting that "the federal government has first rights to the services of naval and Marine reservist in the militia." 48 There is not a better way to implement the concept of a continuum of service or to naturally disperse "jointness".
Conclusion
The Navy's leaders are scrambling to resolve its future. Last June, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chief of naval operations, announced plans to draft by mid-2007 a national maritime strategy that would plot the mission and scope of the 21st-century Navy, providing policy makers with a beacon to guide them in planning the size and makeup of the fleet. 49 Many Americans can still recall the picture showing a military truck in the desert, with a hand-lettered sign in the windshield that read, "One weekend a month, my ass!" Recalling the statement-certainly, an amusing and clever way to proclaim their plight-is not nearly as important as the subliminal messages that are created. The first is by both the truck and its surroundings. It is that the rationale for an expensive Navy is becoming less apparent to the public because one thing the American public can visualize about the recent conflicts is that they have all been decidedly ground wars. The second is for whom the sign is written. The
American public and businesses not only empathize with and respect, but also champion the ideals of the "traditional Reservists"-once again-answering the Nation's call to duty. I do not believe the same admiration will be granted to the so-called "average Reservists."
We find ourselves at a unique time in history when incredible opportunity and substantial risk are converging. It is imperative for us to be prepared to face them head on with a well thought out strategy for transformation. This may be the last chance, at least for a while, to stop this runaway train and save the Navy, Navy Reserve, and one of the nations greatest assetthe "traditional Reservists".
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